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 Using campaign contributions to legislators as an indicator of member influence,
 we explore the impact of term limits on the distribution of power within state legisla-
 tures. Specifically, we perform a cross-state comparison of the relative influence of
 party caucus leaders, committee chairs, and rank-and-file legislators before and after
 term limits. The results indicate that term limits diffuse power in state legislatures,
 both by decreasing average contributions to incumbents and by reducing the power
 of party caucus leaders relative to other members. The change in contribution levels
 across legislators in different chambers implies a shift in power to the upper chamber
 in states with term limits. Thus, the impact of term limits may be attenuated in a
 bicameral system.
 In this article, we explore how term limits produce changes in
 campaign contributions and in the relative power of legislators. Term-
 limits advocates argued that term limits would create what one
 commentator called "natural campaign finance reform" by decreasing
 the value of legislative seats to interest groups (Basham 2001). We
 consider this claim and some variants by reviewing the pattern of
 campaign contributions to legislators in states with and without term
 limits, before and after term limits took effect.1 We find that the average
 level of contributions to legislators decreased in states with term limits
 after the limits took effect and decreased relative to non-term-limited
 states. In addition, contributions to party caucus leaders relative to
 other members dropped after the institution of term limits. The first
 effect is attenuated, however, in the upper chambers of legislatures
 compared to the lower chambers in term-limited states.
 Early analysis attempting to ascertain the effect of term limits
 relied on information drawn from electoral contexts other than
 American state legislatures (Carey 1996; Taylor 1992) or made
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 extrapolations using pre-term-limit electoral data (Moncrief et al. 1 992;
 Opheim 1994). These studies, along with later studies as term limits
 have taken effect, have focused on the effect of term limits on the
 composition of the legislature and on the behavior of officeholders
 (Bernstein and Chadha 2003; Carey, Niemi, and Powell 2000). Several
 studies reviewing institutional effects showed that term limits redis-
 tribute power away from the legislature and toward external
 institutional actors, such as interest groups, state executives, and the
 bureaucracy (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 1998, 2000; Moncrief et al.
 2001; Peery and Little 2003). Very little research has considered the
 effects of term limits on the financing of incumbent legislators, or
 how power changes within legislatures (Drage et al. 2003). In this
 study, which observes the impact of term limits across states, we are
 primarily interested in shifts in contributions before and after term
 limits and how these shifts reflect changes in power from one subset
 of legislators to another.
 Term limits were advocated primarily as a means of abolishing
 legislative careerism. Ironically, many of the states that passed term
 limits, particularly in the West, already had citizen legislatures. We
 expect the effect of term limits in these states to be fairly small. In
 professional legislatures,2 however, term limits can have a significant
 impact on legislative careers. In California, for example, where term
 limits for both houses of the legislature took effect in 1998, fully 75%
 of the Assembly and 60% of the Senate exceeded the respective limits
 imposed by the term-limits initiative, Proposition 140, at the time that
 it was passed (Capell 1996). It is clear that term limits increase legis-
 lative turnover, particularly in states with lifetime rather than
 consecutive term limits. Some evidence also suggests that term limits
 increase racial, ethnic, and occupational diversity in the legislature
 (Caress 2001 ; Carroll and Jenkins 2001), although more-recent analysis
 casts doubt on this dynamic (Moncrief, Niemi, and Powell 2004). It is
 less clear how term limits have altered the internal dynamics of
 legislatures. To date, only a few studies have attempted to measure
 these changes (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 2000).
 Our first goal in this article is to explore how term limits affect
 political contributions to state legislators, which is our measure of
 political power. Reviewing campaign contributions provides insights
 about donor behavior in the wake of term limits, specifically, how
 interest groups distribute money in the face of uncertainty about the
 future power of individual representatives.
 Second, we will consider if the power dynamics across legislative
 chambers have changed in term-limited states. Are party caucus leaders
This content downloaded from 128.218.42.140 on Tue, 09 Jul 2019 00:03:41 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Term Limits 261
 as powerful in a legislature with term limits? Do committee chairs
 retain their traditional power? These questions address, in part, whether
 or not legislatures have the institutional capacity - measured in terms
 of organizational complexity and differentiated leadership roles - to
 perform policy work effectively as an independent branch of govern-
 ment (Polsby 1968).
 Finally, given that a primary goal of term-limit proponents was
 to create a citizen legislature, we think it also worth considering whether
 or not these policies produced parallel effects in each legislative
 chamber. Careerism may not be curtailed through term limits but merely
 reconstituted, so that ambitious legislators move more quickly from
 one house to another. Term limits may have succeeded in creating a
 citizen legislature in one house but not the other.
 Theory and Hypotheses
 Theories about interest group contribution strategies help us
 evaluate the impact of term limits on institutional power in a legislature.
 We begin with the basic premise that interest groups want to affect
 policy through their campaign contributions. Contribution patterns of
 interest groups may reflect multiple strategies (access, goodwill,
 partisanship, and so forth), but we share the view of Sorauf (1992, 65-
 66) that, "In the last analysis, all PAC strategies come down to a single
 goal of affecting the outcomes of public policy in one way or another."
 Our model of campaign contributions implies a vote-buying
 market for legislative services (Denzau and Munger 1986; Grier and
 Munger 1991, 1993) rather than an electioneering model. In other
 words, political contributions constitute a market for legislative
 services: Interest groups make payments to legislators in return for
 policy favors.3 An electioneering model, in contrast, implies that interest
 group money flows primarily to like-minded candidates. In such a
 model, political contributions express the goal of keeping or putting
 legislators in office who share policy preferences with the interest
 group. The distribution of political contributions suggests different
 characteristics about legislatures in different models. The allocation
 of political contributions to members under the vote-buying model
 reflects varying degrees of individual power within the institution.
 Contributions in the electioneering model reflect ideological differences
 among members.
 In the vote-buying model, interest groups seek to maximize their
 use of resources by contributing to legislators who have the most
 influence (Ansolabehere and Snyder 1999; Grenzke 1989). Previous
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 studies of political action committee (PAC) contributions in the Ameri-
 can states demonstrate that PACs give strategically to party leaders
 and committee chairs (see Cassie and Thompson 1998) or to the
 majority party (Thompson, Cassie, and Jewell 1994). Studies of
 Congress also demonstrate important differences in interest group
 strategies across chambers due to dissimilar power structures, such as
 relative influence of committees (Grier and Munger 1993) and majority
 control of the chamber (Cox and Magar 1999).
 Because the flow of political contributions reflects perceptions
 of power, we expect varying levels of incumbent fund-raising to indicate
 the relative power of members in a legislature. In short, contributions
 should reflect the influence of legislators and their ability to control
 policy. In a highly institutionalized legislature, with clearly
 differentiated member roles and structured policy committees, we
 expect to find systematic differences among legislators. Specifically,
 party caucus leaders should receive the most contributions, followed
 by committee chairs, and, lastly, rank-and-file members. In less
 institutionalized legislatures, or citizen legislatures, these differences
 should be present but less pronounced.
 We theorize that term limits have a leveling effect on legislatures,
 largely because they remove sources of leadership power such as
 seniority and the capacity to punish or reward rank-and-file members
 over the long term (because lame-duck status is rarely more than one
 or two sessions away). The weakening of caucus leaders and committee
 chairs should be reflected in the pattern of campaign contributions.
 Instead of working mainly through a caucus leader or committee chair,
 interest groups should be pursuing what Capell (1996) calls a "retail"
 strategy, providing a wider distribution of resources to many members
 rather than engaging in a "wholesale" strategy that channels funds to
 leaders who then deliver votes. Interest groups may be forced to spend
 more resources to reach more members than in the past, as a way of
 forging the winning policy coalition formerly accomplished by legislative
 leaders, but groups may also choose to distribute the same amount of
 money more widely. If interest groups follow this strategy, then all
 members should receive less in campaign contributions. In addition,
 party leaders should lose much of their relative advantage in fund-raising.
 The combination of lame-duck status and inexperience should
 also make it difficult for committee chairs to manage their committees
 effectively, thus making the chairs less attractive to donors. Rank-and-
 file members may be less willing to bargain with chairs who will depart
 the next session or with newly minted chairs who lack significant policy
 expertise and organizational memory. Under these conditions, term-
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 limited committees are less likely to be repositories of policy expertise,
 catalysts of legislative action, or gatekeepers to key policy domains.
 Important decisions will be made elsewhere, either in the executive
 branch (the governor's office or the bureaucracy) or through an expert
 advisory body to the legislature. With the weakened role of committees,
 the committee chairs should have less value to interest groups.
 Under term limits, we expect changes in leadership influence, as
 reflected in campaign contributions, to occur in both legislative
 chambers but at different rates. Party caucus leaders and committee
 chairs in both houses should receive relatively fewer contributions
 under a term-limits regime than in a pre-term-limit or non-term-limited
 legislature. Legislative power, however, should shift to the upper
 chamber because experience is flowing to the senate (Cain and Levin
 1999). The high turnover of legislative seats under term limits encour-
 ages members of the lower houses to run for senate seats, while
 members of the lower house are more likely to come from outside the
 legislature. Of the 80 California Assembly members in office in 1990,
 when term limits were adopted, 21 were subsequently elected to the
 Senate, but only 1 senator from the 1990 Senate was elected to the
 Assembly (Chi and Leatherby 1998). Term-limited upper chambers
 may lose some of their institutional stability but should retain members
 with more experience and adherence to organizational norms than those
 who will occupy the lower chambers.
 Working from these theories, we generate the following
 hypotheses about the changes that occur when a legislature moves
 from a regime with unlimited terms to term limitations.
 Hypothesis I: Average contributions to term-limited legislators
 should decrease relative to the average level of
 contributions before term limits took effect and
 relative to states without term limits.
 Our premise is that donors seek legislators with power, so we
 expect contributions patterns to "flatten" in a term-limited legislature,
 because power is more diffuse than in a non-term-limited legislature.
 Each wave of new members into the legislature destabilizes previous
 power arrangements, making donors unsure about who will have the
 most power in future legislative sessions. Rather than take guesses
 about who will have disproportionate influence in the policy process
 and then concentrate contributions among an exclusive pool of legis-
 lators, donors will pursue a "retail" strategy that attempts to build a
 relationship with each legislator.
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 Hypothesis 2: Contributions to legislators in states with term
 limits in effect will be more decentralized, with
 party caucus leaders and committee chairs
 receiving a level of contributions comparable to
 that received by rank-and-file members.
 Term limits reduce the capacity of legislative leaders to accumu-
 late power over time by developing policy expertise, instituting power-
 enhancing rules, and forging close personal ties with colleagues and
 other power brokers (such as the governor's office, bureaucrats, and
 lobbyists). Therefore, the gap in power between the legislative leader-
 ship and the rank and file will be reduced in a term-limited legislature.
 Hypothesis 3: The effect of term limits will be attenuated in the
 upper chamber.
 Because members of the upper chamber have typically already
 served in the lower chamber, they should have greater policy experi-
 ence and closer personal ties to other power brokers than those members
 in the lower house. They will also have more experience working as
 legislators and moving (or stopping) legislation. As a result, power
 relationships in the upper house will not change as dramatically as
 they will in the lower house. The pattern of donations to members of
 the upper house should not be as different between term-limited and
 non-term-limited states as it will be in the lower house.
 Data and Methods
 We selected eight states for our analysis (Arizona, California,
 Florida, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Washington, and Wisconsin),4
 four with term limits and four without term limits. We were primarily
 interested in changes in contributions to incumbents, so our first priority
 was to choose states that had had term limits in effect for at least one
 full legislative session. We also wanted evidence from states repre-
 senting different regions and different levels of legislative profession-
 alism. But not all states make contributions data publicly available to
 researchers. Ultimately, we were able to collect data for California
 and Maine, where term limits took full effect in 1998, and for Arizona
 and Florida, where term limits took full effect in 2000. Our comparison
 states without term limits (but with data available) were Iowa, Massa-
 chusetts, Washington, and Wisconsin. To determine if states that passed
 term limits were fundamentally different from states that did not, we
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 included two states that had passed term limits but overturned them
 before the limits took effect (Massachusetts and Washington).5
 For all of the states in our analysis, we collected campaign finance
 data for two election cycles apiece. For the states with term limits, we
 chose one election cycle before term limits had taken effect and one
 election cycle after term limits had taken effect. For states without
 term limits, we chose years that were roughly comparable. Regrettably
 for our analysis, not all states passed term limits simultaneously, nor
 did they take effect at a single point in time. We initially collected data
 for term-limited California for the 1986 election cycle (before term
 limits were adopted in 1990) and the 2000 election cycle, and non-
 term-limited Iowa for 1988 and 1996. But because we expected there
 might be a bias toward seeing an effect over time if we looked at states
 too early before term limits took effect, we chose the remainder of our
 data in an effort to compensate for this bias. We believed we would be
 least likely to see a term-limits response in the election cycles just
 before and just after term limits took effect. To be conservative, the
 remainder of our data cover the election cycles immediately before
 and after term limits and a few years prior to the term-limits effect: the
 1996 and 2002 election cycles in Arizona, the 1996 and 1998 election
 cycles in Maine, and the 2000 and 2002 election cycles in Florida. For
 the non-term-limits comparison, we examined the 1998 and 2000
 election cycles in Massachusetts, the 2000 and 2002 election cycles in
 Washington, and the 1996 and 2002 election cycles in Wisconsin.
 We were most interested in how term limits change the balance
 of power in the legislature, as measured by levels of campaign contri-
 butions. As a result, our unit of analysis was incumbent legislators and
 our dependent variable was campaign contributions. These contribu-
 tions came from both organizations and individuals, because we could
 not separate out these contributions for most states in our sample.
 Research on contributions made by individuals suggests, however, that
 the vast majority of these are bundled contributions solicited by interest
 groups (Marshall 1997, 1999). We also found that among the states in
 which we could separate individual and group contributions, the vast
 majority were made by organizations rather than individuals.6 We believe
 overall contributions to legislators largely reflect organizational giving
 and, as a result, serve as a valid indicator of power within the legislature.
 We collected data on campaign contributions for all incumbents
 running for office in each state for the relevant election cycles by con-
 tacting the campaign finance administrative agency in each state. We
 also contacted several state legislative offices in every state to identify
 the most powerful legislative committees in each house and to gather
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 the names of members who held leadership positions on these com-
 mittees, as well as the names of members who were party caucus
 leaders. Our data include over 110 party leaders and 175 committee
 chairs. Further details regarding data collection appear in the Appendix.
 Because our analysis spanned many years of data, from 1985 to
 2002, we translated all contributions data into 2002 real dollars so that
 contributions were comparable across years. We used Consumer Price
 Index (CPI) multipliers for all urban consumers to eliminate inflation
 effects (CPI-U is the baseline CPI provided by the United States Bureau
 of Labor Statistics). In addition, because the legislatures of the states
 in our analysis have varying levels of professionalism (Squire 1992),
 we expected the legislators from different states to have different
 baseline contribution levels, with incumbents from states with profes-
 sional legislatures having higher overall contributions. Because legis-
 lative professionalism is correlated with state population, we divided
 contributions by the size of the population in each legislator's district.
 Therefore, our figures on baseline contributions to incumbent legisla-
 tors are provided in 2002 real dollars per one thousand district residents.
 We suspected that other factors might also affect contribution
 levels across state legislatures. We created variables indicating whether
 or not the state was simultaneously electing a governor, in addition to
 state legislators, and if it was a presidential election year. A simulta-
 neous statewide or national election could increase legislative contri-
 butions by drawing in more contributors, or decrease them by redi-
 recting contributions from legislators to the executive races. We were
 agnostic about the direction of the potential effect. In addition, we
 noted if the state was running the first election after a redistricting,
 which we thought might increase overall contribution levels because
 of the probability that some sitting incumbents would be forced to
 compete for the same seat when district lines were redrawn. We
 collected data for these variables from information provided by the
 National Conference of State Legislatures (2003). We also included a
 dummy variable indicating whether or not a state had public financing
 for legislators in effect, which we expected to decrease contributions.
 Finally, we created dummy variables for each state to control for the
 range of differences across states that were not directly measurable.
 After some consideration, we chose not to include measures of candi-
 date quality, which are difficult to obtain for state legislators. All of
 the legislators in our analysis were incumbents running for reelection.
 By definition, all of them had state legislative experience, and, as a
 result, we expected their quality scores to be fairly comparable and to
 provide little leverage in determining contribution levels.
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 Establishing the determinants of contribution levels for multiple
 election cycles containing the same individuals for several states was
 somewhat complex. We describe our methods in detail in the following
 section.
 Results
 Our results support all three of our proposed hypotheses. It
 appears that states with term limits in effect have lower average
 contribution levels, that contributions are more evenly balanced
 between party caucus leaders and rank-and-file members after term
 limits take effect, and that these effects are less apparent in the upper
 chamber in states with term limits than in the lower chamber.
 When we compare states with and without term limits, before
 and after term limits took effect, we see that the average level of
 contributions (per one thousand residents in each incumbent's district)
 drops in states with term limits. States with and without term limits
 had average contribution levels of $983 and $763, respectively, (in
 real 2002 dollars) in each state's first election cycle. In the states with
 term limits, average contributions dropped to $690 in the second
 election cycle, but the average contribution in non-term-limited states
 increased to $891 . This effect was consistent for both upper and lower
 houses of the legislatures and appears to support the claim that term
 limits act as a form of campaign finance reform. But this finding may
 mask underlying patterns of interest group contributions. A detailed
 study of tobacco industry contributions before and after term limits,
 for example, showed that tobacco companies gave smaller contribu-
 tions to a larger number of legislators, spending the same amount before
 and after term limits but gaining more access by contributing to more
 legislators (Apollonio, Glantz, and Bero 2004). This result does imply,
 however, that organizations may be pursuing a retail strategy in the
 wake of term limits. The first hypothesis, that legislators in term-limited
 states receive lower average contributions, appears to be correct.
 In the states that passed term limits, party caucus leaders clearly
 controlled most of the political contributions before term limits took
 effect (Figure 1). These leaders received average contributions of
 $2,646 (again, in real 2002 dollars per one thousand district residents),
 committee chairs received $1,138, and rank-and-file members received
 $839. The average contributions to all legislators dropped after the
 institution of term limits, but the effect was most extreme for party
 caucus leaders, whose average contributions dropped by over half, to
 $ 1 , 1 96. Contributions to committee chairs also dropped by almost half,
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 FIGURE 1
 Changes in Mean Contributions to Incumbent Legislators
 for Term-Limited and Non-Term-Limited States
 by Incumbent Position, Pre- and Post-Term Limit Effect
 (in 2002 real dollars, per 1,000 district residents)
 Source: Data compiled by the authors, as described in the text. Multiple states and
 election cycles are included.
 to $660, and average contributions to rank-and-file members dropped
 less dramatically, to $693. In the election cycle before term limits took
 effect, party caucus leaders received over three times the contribu-
 tions of rank-and-file members. After term limits took effect, their
 contributions were less than twice as large.
 Non-term-limited states do not show the same flattening of
 contributions in the same time period. If anything, party caucus leaders
 increased their relative share of contributions. The states that did not
 pass term limits in our sample began with a lower share of contribu-
 tions going to party caucus leaders, probably because the term-limited
 states in our sample are slightly weighted toward professional legisla-
 tures, where term limits first took effect (California and Florida). In
 the first election cycle, party caucus leaders received average contri-
 butions of $1,420, committee chairs received $794, and rank-and-file
 members received $724. In the second election cycle, contributions to
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 committee chairs and rank-and-file members increased somewhat, to
 $899 and $790, but contributions to party caucus leaders increased by
 over 50%, to $2,516.
 We considered alternative explanations for the possible decline
 in leadership contributions in term-limited states but found them less
 plausible. For example, caucus leaders under term limits might lack
 the experience to be effective fund-raisers. But limited experience af-
 fects rank-and-file members as well as leaders, so the rank-and-file
 members should perform just as badly under term limits. More impor-
 tant, interview evidence suggests that fund-raising capability is
 becoming an essential criterion in leadership selection after term limits;
 members can no longer rely on personal evaluations of potential leaders'
 policy expertise or legislative skills that have been demonstrated over
 long careers (Drage et al. 2003).
 Another conceivable explanation for the leveling of contribu-
 tions is a possible increase in competitive elections under term limits,
 which could spur more contributions to rank-and-file members. Over-
 all, however, seats became less competitive over time in our analysis.7
 We note also that average contributions under term limits declined for
 all types of incumbents. If competitive elections were driving the
 difference between leadership and member fund-raising, then we would
 expect legislators to increase their average level of contributions during
 this period. Instead, contributions to rank-and-file members also
 declined, although not as dramatically as those to party leaders.
 Finally, our results do not appear to be linked to legal changes,
 such as changes in campaign finance laws during the time period we
 consider. For example, if a state had lowered contribution limits to
 candidates from $1,000 to $500, then party leaders might find it more
 difficult to amass campaign funds after that change. Yet only one of
 the states in our sample, California, lowered its contribution limits
 during this time. When we analyzed our data with and without
 California, the results did not change.8
 The second hypothesis suggested that contributions in states under
 term limits would be more decentralized than contributions in the same
 states before the imposition of term limits, as well as relative to states
 without term limits. Building on the descriptive evidence supporting
 this point, we ran regressions on the level of contributions to incum-
 bents in the states in our sample, which confirm the effect we have
 already observed.
 The regression to determine associations between contributions
 and legislative characteristics is somewhat complex, because incum-
 bents in states without term limits (and occasionally in states with
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 term limits) may appear repeatedly in multiple election cycles. To com-
 pensate for the correlated errors observed when the same individual
 appears multiple times in the data, we ran our regressions using robust
 standard errors with clustering; each individual that appeared multiple
 times made up a cluster.9 Errors are correlated within the cluster
 representing a single individual, but different individuals are assumed
 to be independent of each other.
 Our first regression reviewed the correlates of average contribu-
 tions (in 2002 real dollars for every one thousand residents of each
 district) for incumbents of the lower houses of each state (Table 1). As
 expected, party leaders in non-term-limited states and in pre-term-
 limited states received over $2,000 more in contributions than did rank-
 and-file members.10 Contributions to committee chairs did not differ
 significantly from those made to rank-and-file members. For states with
 term limits in effect, neither party caucus leaders nor committee chairs
 received significantly more contributions than did rank-and-file members.
 We also ran a regression comparing term-limited states only, before and
 after the term-limits effect, and controlling for the competitiveness of
 seats. (We were only able to obtain competitiveness data for the term-
 limited states.) These results are robust across both specifications.11
 Having term limits in effect, however, decreased the level of
 contributions to members of the lower house. When we control for
 other factors, we find that the imposition of term limits decreased the
 level of contributions by over $500 per incumbent. This effect is larger
 in practice, because contributions in the regression are given in per
 capita terms. For a California Assembly member, the real size of this
 effect is over $200,000 in 2002 dollars. Control variables found, as
 expected, that Democrats received significantly less in contributions
 than did Republicans and that members of the majority party received
 more in contributions than members of the minority party. In addition,
 incumbent legislators received greater contributions in gubernatorial
 election years than other legislators.
 A surprising finding was that public financing was correlated
 with increased contributions to incumbents running for office. Although
 our analysis includes only two states with public financing, this result
 suggests that incumbents, on average, received more funds through
 "clean elections" programs that provided public funds than through
 the private financing system. We had expected to find that states with
 public funding would see a reduction in average contributions, given
 that public funds provided to each legislator are capped by mandatory
 spending limits, whereas states with private financing allow unlimited
 spending.12
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 TABLE 1
 Predictors of Contributions to Incumbents
 in the Lower Legislative House
 (in 2002 real dollars, per 1,000 district residents)
 Variables Coefficient Standard Error
 Explanatory Variables
 Committee chair (no term limits) $ 1 24 117
 Party leader (no term limits) $2,040 550**
 Committee chair (term limits) -$1,017 834
 Party leader (term limits) -$43 227
 Term limits in effect -$517 1 04**
 Control Variables
 Democratic incumbent -$138 50**
 Candidate's party is in power $214 51**
 Redistricting year -$28 99
 Gubernatorial election year $198 68**
 Presidential election year -$145 96
 Public financing $519 168**
 State Dummy Variables
 Arizona -$1,070 152**
 California $19 160
 Iowa -$441 106**
 Massachusetts -$579 131**
 Maine -$168 103
 Washington -$47 136
 Wisconsin -$1,056 251**
 Constant $1,174 159
 N= 1,414
 Clusters = 1,068
 R2=0.25
 Note: Figures are regression coefficients using robust standard errors with clustering
 (generated by Stata 7.0). The dependent variable is the level of contributions received
 by an incumbent legislator in 2002 real dollars, per 1,000 district residents. The
 baseline incumbent is a rank-and-file member.
 Source: Data compiled by the authors, as described in the text. Multiple states and
 election cycles are included.
 *p<. 05; **/?<. 01.
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 TABLE 2
 Predictors of Contributions to Incumbents
 in the Upper Legislative House
 (in 2002 real dollars, per 1,000 district residents)
 Variables Coefficient Standard Error
 Explanatory Variables
 Committee chair (no term limits) $117 85
 Party leader (no term limits) $6 1 1 242**
 Committee chair (term limits) -$342 323
 Party leader (term limits) -$56 1 8 1
 Term limits in effect -$ 1 69 1 30
 Control Variables
 Democratic incumbent -$12 61
 Candidate's party is in power $107 56
 Redistricting year $ 1 6 172
 Gubernatorial election year $55 127
 Presidential election year -$6 166
 Public financing $55 167
 State Dummy Variables
 Arizona -$351 139**
 California $418 193*
 Iowa -$127 144
 Massachusetts -$18 211
 Maine $182 162
 Washington $400 148**
 Wisconsin $87 256
 Constant $443 267
 N = 410
 Clusters = 339
 R2 = 0.19
 Note: Figures are regression coefficients using robust standard errors with clustering
 (generated by Stata 7.0). The dependent variable is the level of contributions received
 by an incumbent legislator in 2002 real dollars, per 1,000 district residents. The
 baseline incumbent is a rank-and-file member.
 Source: Data compiled by the authors, as described in the text. Multiple states and
 election cycles are included.
 */?<. 05; **/?<. 01.
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 Overall, both the expectation that term-limited legislators would
 receive lower contributions than non-term-limited legislators and the
 hypothesis that party caucus leaders would have less power under term
 limits appear to be borne out in the lower legislative house. To build
 on this analysis, we performed the same regression for members of the
 upper chambers in the sample states. The results were similar but
 suggest that our third hypothesis, that these effects are attenuated in
 the upper chamber, is also valid (Table 2).13
 In the analysis of contributions made to incumbents in the upper
 chamber, we find that party leaders in non-term-limited legislatures
 and pre-term-limited legislatures received more in contributions than
 did rank-and-file members. As in the regression for incumbents of the
 lower house, committee chairs - even the chairs of the most powerful
 committees that we considered - were not significantly different from
 rank-and-file members. The substantive size of the effect for party
 leaders in the upper chamber, however, was much smaller than it was
 in the lower chamber, with an increased contribution of roughly $600,
 compared to more than $2,000 in the lower house. As in the lower
 house, party leaders, committee chairs, and rank-and-file members in
 the post-term-limits regimes did not receive significantly different levels
 of contributions, a result suggesting that there is a flattening of power
 even in the upper house. Unlike in the lower house, however, there
 was no correlation between the institution of term limits and lower
 overall contribution levels. Whatever effect term limits have in
 decreasing contributions, it does not seem to hold in the upper chamber.
 Overall, we find support for all three of our proposed hypotheses.
 Term limits do appear to be associated with decreased contribution
 levels, at least in the lower house of states with term limits. In addition,
 term limits equalize the contribution levels of party caucus leaders,
 committee chairs, and rank-and-file members, a finding that implies
 power is decentralized in states with term limits. Finally, although the
 decentralization effect holds in the upper chamber of term-limited
 legislatures, term limits do not appear to decrease overall contribution
 levels there, which suggests that the effects of constraining legislative
 tenure are reduced, at least in the short term, in a bicameral system
 where legislators can move up as they gain experience.
 Discussion
 Term limits appear to alter the power structure of American
 legislatures, creating a leveling effect among members. This reform
 affects the lower house more than the upper house, because newcomers
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 typically start their legislative careers in the lower house. The lower
 house seems to lose some of its institutional structure as traditional
 power brokers, such as party leaders, lose influence relative to rank-
 and-file legislators. In the senate, the organization of power does not
 appear to change as much because the infusion of new legislators
 typically comes from the lower house, where members have gained
 experience and personal ties that support traditional norms of legislative
 policymaking. In this way, the senate becomes the repository of
 experienced legislators who are familiar with conducting legislative
 business through policy committees and the party leadership structure.14
 One implication of our findings is that the relatively stable structure in
 the senate may make the upper chamber more effective at processing
 legislation than the lower chamber, even if party caucus leaders are
 less powerful than they were before the imposition of term limits.
 In an effort to maximize the impact of their resources, donors appear
 to have adapted to term limits in two ways. First, they have shifted resources
 to the more-experienced chamber, where the environment is more
 predictable and legislation is likely to be processed more efficiently. Second,
 they seem to pursue a retail strategy, especially in the lower house,
 where party caucus leaders have been weakened. Instead of concen-
 trating money in the hands of leadership and pursuing policy goals
 wholesale, donors have broadened their strategy to reach other members.
 The changes in career trajectories introduced by term limits could
 make the bicameral system even more relevant in policymaking than
 it has been in the past. The inducement for lower-house members to
 migrate to the upper chamber when they complete their stint in the
 lower chamber attenuates the full impact of term limits, at least in the
 short term. The realization of a citizen legislature, a primary goal of
 term-limits policy, should be felt most strongly in lower legislative
 houses. Experience and careerism, however, may still be relevant in
 the upper chamber. The final outcome - which may not satisfy
 supporters of term limits - could be that the upper chambers, containing
 a greater proportion of career legislators, become the prime movers of
 policy because lower chambers cannot organize themselves as well to
 conduct legislative business. Similarly, the upper chamber may
 frequently serve to block legislation, because the policy gatekeeping
 role of committee chairs and party leaders in the lower chamber appears
 to have weakened under term limits. 15 Although, in terms of the quantity
 of bills passed, legislative productivity may not be affected by term
 limits in either chamber (Squire 1998), future research might examine
 if the quality and refinement of legislation take place largely in the
 upper chamber, with more-experienced legislators. It may also be worth
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 exploring whether or not bicameral differences persist over time as
 term limits remove veteran legislators from the upper chamber.
 These findings about changing power within the legislature
 suggest that this institution should lose power relative to other political
 actors, such as the governor and bureaucracy. In theory, legislatures
 gain influence, in part, by increasing their complexity through a strong
 committee structure and institutionalized leadership roles (Polsby 1968;
 Rosenthal 1998). The high levels of turnover caused by term limits
 appear to make legislatures less complex, weakening the influence of
 organizational leaders who support institutional norms that enhance
 organizational stability, predictability, and efficiency. We observe that
 at least one legislative chamber is undergoing a process in which party
 leaders and committee chairs are weakened, a finding that suggests
 committees are becoming less important in the policy process. Given
 that committees are typically the repositories of specialized knowledge
 that wield influence in policy deliberations, we think it reasonable to
 expect the legislature collectively to have less clout relative to other
 political actors. Term limits may undermine the quality of legislation
 passed and reduce the bargaining power of the legislature relative to
 other political actors, especially if legislative leaders lack the concen-
 trated power to broker policy that they possessed prior to term limits.
 Dorie Apollonio is a Postdoctoral Fellow in the Department of
 Social and Behavioral Sciences, University of California, San
 Francisco, 3333 California Street, Suite 420, San Francisco, CA 94143-
 0613 <dorie.apollonio@ucsfedu>. Raymond J. La Raja is Assistant
 Professor of Political Science, 200 Hicks Way, Thompson Hall,
 University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Amherst, MA 01003
 < laraja@polsci. umass. edu > .
 APPENDIX
 Identifying Committee Chairs and Party Leaders
 All data listed here were collected by the authors (Arizona, California, Iowa, Wisconsin)
 or by Matt Saradjian and the authors (Florida, Massachusetts, Maine, Washington).
 Committee Chairs
 For each state and legislative session used in our analysis, we asked the legislative
 offices to identify the most powerful committees (the "juice" committees) in the
 legislature. For each committee we identified, we listed the chair and the ranking
 minority member as being committee chairs.
 Arizona House committees, 1995-1996, 2001-2002
 Appropriations; Rules
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 Arizona Senate committees, 1995-1996, 2001-2002
 Appropriations; Rules; Finance
 California Assembly committees, 1985-1986, 1999-2000
 Agriculture; Appropriations; Education; Health; Insurance; Utilities and
 Commerce
 California Senate committees, 1985-1986, 1999-2000
 Agriculture; Appropriations; Education; Health; Insurance; Utilities and
 Commerce
 Florida House councils, 1999-2000
 Fiscal Responsibility; Procedural; Academic Excellence
 Florida House councils, 2001-2002
 Fiscal Responsibility; Procedural; Lifelong Learning
 Florida Senate councils, 1999-2000
 Appropriations; Finance; Rules
 Florida Senate councils, 2001-2002
 Appropriations; Rules; Taxation
 Iowa House committees, 1987-1988, 1995-1996
 Agriculture; Appropriations; Education; Natural Resources and Outdoor
 Recreation; Ways and Means
 Iowa Senate committees, 1987-1988, 1995-1996
 Agriculture; Appropriations; Commerce; Education; Environment;
 Natural Resources; Transportation
 Maine House and Senate committees, 1995-1996, 1997-1998
 Appropriations; Education; Taxes
 Massachusetts House committees, 1997-1998, 2001-2002
 Ways and Means; Judiciary; Rules
 Massachusetts Senate committees, 1997-1998, 1999-2000
 Ways and Means; Judiciary; Public Safety
 Washington House committees, 1999-2000, 2001-2002
 Appropriations; Finance; Rules
 Washington Senate committees, 1999-2000, 2001-2002
 Education; Transportation; Ways and Means
 Wisconsin House committees, 1995-1996, 2001-2002
 Finance (joint); Judiciary; Welfare Reform
 Wisconsin Senate committees, 1995-1996, 2001-2002
 Finance (j°mt); Health, Human Services, and Aging; Judiciary
 Party Leaders
 For each state and legislative session used in our analysis, we asked the legislative
 offices to identify the party caucus leaders in the legislature.
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 Arizona House
 Speaker, Majority Leader, Assistant Majority Leader, Minority Leader,
 Assistant Minority Leader
 Arizona Senate
 President, Majority Leader, Majority Whip, Minority Leader, Assistant
 Floor Leader
 California Assembly
 Speaker, Speaker Pro Tempore (and Assistant), Majority Floor Leader
 (and Assistant), Minority Floor Leader (and Assistant)
 California Senate
 President Pro Tempore, Democratic Floor Leader (and Assistant),
 Republican Floor Leader (and Assistant)
 Florida House and Senate
 Speaker, Speaker Pro Tempore, Majority Leader, Minority Leader (and
 Assistant)
 Iowa House and Senate
 Speaker, Majority Leader, Minority Leader
 Maine House and Senate
 Speaker, Speaker Pro Tempore, Majority Leader, Minority Leader (and
 Assistant)
 Massachusetts House and Senate
 Speaker, Majority Leader, Whip, Minority Leader (and Assistant)
 Washington House and Senate
 Speaker, Speaker Pro Tempore, Majority Leader, Minority Leader (and
 Assistant)
 Wisconsin House
 Speaker, Majority Leader, Assistant Majority Leader, Minority Leader,
 Assistant Minority Leader
 Wisconsin Senate
 President, Majority Leader, Assistant Majority Leader, Minority Leader,
 Assistant Minority Leader
 NOTES
 We appreciate the helpful comments and advice of Bruce Cain, Beth Capell,
 John Green, Shannon Jenkins, Thad Kousser, Doug Roscoe, and the anonymous
 reviewers. We are also grateful to Kenneth Mayer for providing some of the data on
 contributions to state legislators, and to Matt Saradjian for his assistance in identifying
 state party leaders and committee chairs. D. E. Apollonio would like to acknowledge
 the American Legacy Foundation for assistance in funding this research.
 1 . In the early 1990s, 21 American states established limits on the tenure of state
 legislators (National Conference of State Legislatures 2003). The new limited terms
 typically constrained legislators to a maximum of six or eight years in the lower house
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 and eight years in the upper house. Currently, 15 states operate under a term-limits
 regime, 12 of which have term limits in effect (the term limits in the remaining 3 states
 will take effect in future election cycles). Two states repealed term limits and 4 had
 them rejected by state courts.
 2. We use Squire's (1992) measure to assess whether or not state legislatures
 are professional. Squire's measure considers member compensation, staff support and
 facilities, and the time that service demands.
 3. We are agnostic regarding the debate over whether money buys legislation
 or simply access to the legislator. Both possibilities imply that relative differences in
 power among legislators account for the flow of political contributions to them.
 4. We are immensely grateful to Kenneth Mayer, who has collected data on
 several states with public financing and makes these data available to researchers through
 the Wisconsin Campaign Finance Project at the University of Wisconsin, Madison
 (Mayer 2004). All of the Arizona and Wisconsin contributions data used in our analysis
 were taken from this website.
 5. In our initial analysis, we included a variable for all states that had passed
 term limits, but it was not significant, and thus the variable is not present in our final
 regressions.
 6. In California, for example, more than 80% of contributions to incumbents
 came from organizations rather than individuals. In Iowa, which does not have a
 professional legislature like California and where we might expect a greater share of
 individual contributions, nearly two-thirds of the contributions received also came
 from organizations rather than individuals.
 7. The average percent of competitive seats in the first election cycle was 26%,
 but only 22% of seats were competitive in the second election cycle. Only California
 increased its share of competitive seats from the first election cycle (10%) to the second
 election cycle (15%), but our results were consistent across all subsets of the term-
 limited states. To date, there have been few studies that demonstrate term limits increase
 competition. An early study of the California legislature suggested that term limits
 increase competition significantly (Daniel and Lott 1997), but a more recent compara-
 tive study of Michigan and Ohio indicates that term limits have not created significant
 increases in political competition (Allebaugh and Pinney 2003).
 8. We were especially concerned about California because the Assembly
 Speaker in 1986 was renowned as a prodigious fund-raiser.
 9. Zorn (2001) demonstrated that this generalized model is superior to using a
 series of dummy variables. Unfortunately, it cannot be applied simultaneously to both
 repeated individuals and repeated state-level observations. As a result, we used the
 clustering method to compensate for correlated errors across individuals and dummy
 variables to compensate for correlated errors across states.
 10. Our initial regression reviewed only states with and without term limits in
 the second election cycle. The results were nearly identical to the regression using all
 cases, so we describe the combined case for ease in interpretation and to maximize
 sample size. We also ran separate regressions, dropping an individual state each time,
 to see if any particular state was driving our results. Again, the results were nearly
 identical.
 11. The competitive-seat measure was significant at the .05 level for the term-
 limited-states-only regression for the lower house but not in the regression for the
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 upper house. Our measure of seat competitiveness was a difference of 5% or less in the
 percentage of major-party-registered voters in each district prior to the election. The
 inclusion of the measure of seat competitiveness did not change the coefficients or
 significance of our other variables. As demonstrated by Thompson, Cassie, and Jewell
 (1994), expected competitiveness is not necessarily a factor determining the level of
 contributions to incumbents.
 12. This finding is not germane to our central question, but it merits further
 study. We can only speculate that many incumbents, who might not face difficult
 réélections and therefore would not typically raise significant amounts of private money,
 chose to accept a relatively large lump sum of public funds when it became available.
 13. As mentioned, we also ran a regression that included only the term-limited
 states before and after the imposition of term limits (including a measure of district
 competitiveness). The results were mostly comparable, but one difference from the
 results reported in the text is that term limits also appeared to decrease overall contri-
 butions in the senate. This result within term-limit states, before and after the effect, is
 distinct from the bicameral effect we discuss relative to other states. Otherwise, as in
 the lower house, our results were nearly identical, and the inclusion of a measure of
 competitiveness was not significant nor did it change our results.
 14. We should note, however, that it is typical for the upper chamber in state
 legislatures to have a weaker committee system, as does the U.S. Senate, because this
 chamber has fewer members than the lower chamber, making it easier to manage affairs
 with a less-developed organizational structure.
 1 5. Cain (1996) notes that a great deal of the effect of term limits depends on the
 learning curve of new legislators and whether or not the requirements of the job are
 difficult to master relatively quickly.
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